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Over the last few years, experiences in naval coalition force activities have indicated a
considerable shortfall in interoperability between participants. This has been detrimental
to their overall capability and reduced their effectiveness. The problems are associated
not only with the technical differences between the participating platforms but also with
the lack of understanding of how to ‘function’ as a network centric coalition task force.
The latter being caused by the limited experience of working in such an environment, due
to their limited occurrence, and also the cost of running any large scale exercises to
address the basic problems.  A collaborative venture has been underway for 18 months
between UK and US naval research groups where an encrypted link is being used for the
network connectivity to provide a suitable research environment to investigate the
problems. The objective is to address such areas as data requirements, management and
filtering along with the necessary control strategies essential for effective interoperability
in a networked coalition force. As well as gaining experience in areas that can be
transferred onto operational systems, the four year program should provide some
yardstick for measurement of interoperability and whether there is an improvement in
technical capability or, perhaps, show that coalition force activity is primarily a political
requirement.
Background
Experiences in the Gulf War and during the Kosovo conflict have highlighted the
problems of multi-nation naval task forces working together in an efficient co-ordinated
way. Even though each participating member has some level of technological support at
the communications and combat system level, the level for communications and data
exchange has been that of manual transfer of paper copies or joint presence of
representatives from each unit in one physical location. The problem has been the
inability of these systems to exchange meaningful information arising partially due to the
differing technologies which are present in the participating platforms but also to the
different ways in which data is interpreted and the meaning of the information generated
from it.  Expressions such as ‘drowning in data and starved of information’ and the
comment that ‘knowledge superiority requires information with the appropriate latency
and fidelity’ are the basic statements on the problem and these have been made by those
who were in charge during the conflicts mentioned such as Admiral Stone, Naval Task
Force Commander off Kosovo.
There has been an increased emphasis on the adoption of a Network Centric approach
and information integration in military task forces with both the platform level and task
force command requiring a fused view of the joint “battle space”, the term which has now
replaced “battle field” as more representative of the environment in which the operations
take place.  As was pointed out by US Admiral Jay Johnson the move to Network Centric
Warfare is a fundamental shift away from platform-centric thinking.  It will require
changes to organisational structures and doctrine that will lead to the development of new
tactics and operational procedures.  The need for effective battle force interoperability
and painful experiences in the area, have given rise to US initiatives such as the
Distributed Engineering Plant (DEP) but they are basically addressing single nation
issues in the area, between systems of comparable technologies with similar command
structures and the same interpretation of data into information.  The need to operate
effectively as part of a coalition force will require some modification of long held notions
about command and control, particularly the principle of the unity of command and the
ability not only to send out data but to transform it into meaningful information. The need
is for delivery of the right amount of the right information to the right place at the right
time in the right format in a network-centric warfare environment to increase the
effectiveness of the participating units.
Recently, as part of an information exchange between the US staff at what is now
NAVSEA Newport and researchers at the new UK MoD organisation, DSTL at the Land
Based Test Site in Portsmouth, consideration has been given to how best to address the
problems at the multi-national level.  The simple answer of bringing representative
vessels of both nations together to carry out an exercise and hoping to resolve the
numerous problems was never on, mainly due to the cost of using the actual operational
platforms  (the estimated combined costs using actual platforms exceeds $500,000 per
day).  Thus, the approach adopted derives from prior experiences and investments by
both countries in the technologies adopted in support of Open System Architectures,
Interoperability Test-beds, and Naval Combat System Engineering in such programmes
as the New Attack Submarine (NSSN CIT & WAIF) and UK CSTDF/POST/CSI research
programmes with the opportunity being taken to join their respective test beds via an
appropriate encrypted link.
This is allowing us, using basic commercial communications and the necessary
encryption equipment, to experiment with two combat systems exchanging data using a
common scenario under controlled conditions.  While, from the operational point of view
our scenario is slightly unusual, the likelihood of a US submarine and a UK surface
vessel jointly prosecuting a mission is remote, it does provide for a set of conditions
which are very relevant to the coalition network situation. The data transfers will not be
continuous and the tactical pictures on the two systems will be considerably different,
which is exactly the situation that any new vessel joining a coalition task force network
would encounter.  The work so far has concentrated on the establishment of the basic
capability in terms of the network and the support software with both commercial
products and DoD tools being evaluated in the software area.
 Support Tools
One of the tools used during the first stage of the collaboration has been Odyssey
Collaborative System (OCS).  This product derived from investments by ONR.  It
supports applications that make use of interactive video conferencing, and as our
collaboration required an extensive amount of video teleconferencing connectivity this
was an obvious tool to try.  To facilitate the assessment of Odyssey the UK and US sides
agreed that the US side would install the Server-side while the UK installed the Client-
side of Odyssey.  The installation was a non-trivial task.  The initial installation was
attempted on a Windows NT4 machine but was troublesome so after advice from our US
colleagues an attempt was made to install on Windows 2000, which the US had been
successful in achieving.  This also failed, so NT4 was attempted again and after much
lower level tweaking of the configuration and batch files it succeeded this time.  With the
UK side being the client to the US’s server the geographical split then brought the
physical networking infrastructure to the fore.  After further liasing with US counterparts,
the US Odyssey client came up to a level at which we could start using the tool.
Experiences with Odyssey
As the UK side was set as the client it was always necessary to have the US side’s server
up and running before anything could be done. This was rarely if ever a problem.
However, the responses from the server seemed to come at glacial speed.  At some points
during the OCS interaction the whole system would lock up and no responses could be
got from the server.  This may have been due to timeouts built into the system, but at the
time there was no way of knowing.  The situation invariably came about from the way in
which interaction with Odyssey took place.  One of the impressive features of Odyssey is
the ability to create and define objects and rooms.  In collaboration with our US
colleagues a set of buildings was created to reflect platforms (frigates, submarines, etc.)
and our respective labs.  Within those rooms, subsidiary areas such as operations rooms,
sonar rooms, lab rooms and so on were created into which documents could be made
available and where virtual ‘meetings’ with people took place.  It was hoped that it would
be possible to ‘move’ around within these rooms, retrieve and view objects such as
documents, and arrange private or public chats with team members determined to be
‘present’.  All of this interaction was to be carried out using Odyssey’s point and click
interface.  The reality was, however, not initially encouraging.
The system response time was inadequate.  For example, one would click on a room to
‘teleport’ oneself into it and it would be minutes before the room was updated to reflect
one’s presence in that room.  After discussing with US counterparts who assured us they
had had no similar problems, it was surmised that the problem must lie with the
communications network to the US.  This was indeed more than likely as was obvious
from experiences using our network ‘link’ with other commercial products like
NetMeeting.  Closer examination revealed that the ISDN connection was inexplicably
dropping channels during the link-up. Another source of latency may also have been
introduced by the network hardware.  The problem was to then find a way of assessing
Odyssey in the absence of reliably fast communications links.
It was decided to remove the need for networking in a geographically dispersed
environment.  A copy of the then latest Odyssey software for both the Client-side and the
Server-side was installed on two different machines in the UK.  The installation was
eventually managed with one NT4 machine set as a client and another as the server.
With this arrangement it was possible to get it working.  It became possible to control the
creating of rooms, which initially was only the preserve of the US’s server side of
Odyssey.  The response from the system was very much improved and navigation
relatively easy, moving from room to room, carrying out private conversations or open
discussions.
Odyssey itself is a very comprehensive tool with many desirable features that are not
readily available on many similar commercial packages.  It is more of a ‘virtual space’
environment than merely a collaboration tool, the latter for our needs focusing more on
knowledge management.  Of the more impressive features is its user-customisability to
reflect the geographical set-up of the environment where teams are located.  This has the
advantage of adding some realism, albeit limited.  The virtual presence of other team
members on screen and being able to notice their comings and goings has the effect of
letting one know the possibility of instant problem or knowledge sharing.  There are
additional capabilities that would be desirable, but would appear to have been overlooked
in the current version of the Odyssey system.
Document management is a vital part of working in teams.  It is the main means by which
plans are updated, revised and issued.  Read and write permissions are good as controls
on documents but other features are important.  For example, it would be useful to have a
way in which common documents being written could be controlled in such a way that
the document can only be checked out by one person at a time, thus protecting them from
being overwritten when two people work on the same document simultaneously.
Additionally, facilitating the creation of private and public versions of documents would
be an advantage.  There are more document management features that are needed to ease
collaborative work and we await the next revision of the tool.
Conclusions Regarding Odyssey
Odyssey has some excellent features as a tool but the experiences we have had so far
indicate that its maturity is a still at a low level.  Specific shortcomings can be
summarized as follows:
1. It is rather a difficult tool to install.  We had to dive into the internals, changing batch
files and redirecting paths.
2. The response times suggest that a geographically dispersed team working
collaboratively would have difficulty using some of its features that require higher
bandwidth.
3 It is not really a collaborative tool but more of a virtual space environment where
team members may be in the same time zone and therefore more dynamically
interacting.  Collaboration puts more emphasis on synchronisation of activities,
avoiding duplication of effort when working on the same subject, and the
management of information.
One suggestion that we would make is to investigate modular implementation of some of
the features of the system, not unlike the way Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) tools
such as SAP are implemented, where a subset of the features can be selected.  This is
achieved, not merely by disabling a particular feature or module, but by not building it
into the implemented system.  This may have the advantage of simplifying and
lightening the system as a whole.
Overall, the ideas behind the tool are very good and the tool would be suited to most
activities in any collaborative environment, which requires representation of different
‘locations’, which, in our case, are naval platforms.
Operational Aspects
Moving from the support side of our activities to the operational side of the collaboration,
a common scenario has been generated to meet the needs of our investigation.   As
indicated earlier, the scenario may not reflect the normal run of platform interactions, but
it envisages a joint operation in response to terrorist activities and involves surface,
subsurface and air units with the possibility to extend the action into other domains as
needed in the future.  The complexity of the operation is expandable but has been kept at
a simplistic level at present while the problems of communications and synchronisation
have been resolved between the sim/stim drivers that implement the scenario.  The basic
idea is that sensor data is being processed through the UK surface combat data fusion
system and the output transmitted to the US subsurface unit at the appropriate times, and
that the US platform is providing periodic sonar picture updates based on the same
sim/stim program to enable the operational task to be executed.  This raises several issues
concerning the data, which is being exchanged.
The research work is addressing such issues as:
• data requirements
• data management and filtering
• data structures and content
• control strategies
• data servers vs. datalinks
Having establish the initial connectivity and the passing of tactical picture data, the major
effort has moved on to investigate the formats and structure of information, the
information architecture, and ways for both sides to reach an agreement on their
interpretation of that information within their own environment.  There is no point in
exchanging data that adds no value.  Early tests are being used to identify the basic levels
that are acceptable to the two combat systems in terms of enhancing the system capability
by the introduction of new information, but at the same time not overloading it with
useless (and potentially distracting) information.  There will be several tests in this area
to demonstrate the basic capabilities that will be required to support the more complex
experiments.
In a more general subject area, it will be necessary to investigate the relationship between
a subsurface platform and surface platform and the transfer of information between them.
It will be necessary to investigate the use of current datalinks (Link-11 and Link-16) or
other message formats and to consider whether the present operational procedures are
acceptable in the new network-centric environment.  It might be an appropriate time to
consider how best to handle the coalition force information in this situation as distinct
from the present data link scenarios.  Although existing Link-11 and Link-16 include
some subsurface message formats they have been used little to date and the possibility of
developing some form of Coalition Data Server (CDS) is being considered.
Large scale information transfer involving submarines is likely to be performed on a
spasmodic basis, enabled only when a submarine is in contact with a surface platform.
The purpose of this area of research is to determine:
• The effect on the above water platform of integrating such spasmodic and time
varying information from a submarine into the rest of its tactical picture involving
organic and non-organic wide area non-real time information.
• The effect on the under water platform of integrating real time information into its
picture and subsequent handling of that data in terms of staleness, predictions etc.
The effort here will build on the present set of experiments, looking at the types of
information that could be exchanged and how this could be managed.  The aim at this
stage will be to compare particularly the pictures compiled in the relevant surface and
subsurface platforms as time progresses without refresh.  It will be attempted to
determine whether the degree of drift between the actual and perceived positions
outweighs the initial transfer of information and whether better staleness or prediction
measures could be used to improve the pictures.  It will also allow some assessment of
the best options for interoperation between the surface and subsurface platforms in terms
of the procedures covering such aspects as frequency of contact and amount and type of
data exchanged.
The follow on from this is to provide the ability to investigate the remote use of sensors
and weapons such as EW, sonar, torpedoes and missiles between coalition platforms,
initially starting with the sub to surface link and then expanding to the different platforms
in the network. The network at this stage should be capable of allowing land and air
platforms to be integrated as part of the environment and the full coalition battle space
scenario addressed building on the experience gained from the earlier investigations and
experiments.  It will also provide the ability to investigate the remote use of sensors and
weapons such as radar, IR, EW, sonar, torpedoes and missiles between coalition
platforms, initially starting with the sub to surface link and then expanding to the
different platforms in the network. The concept here is that the network will provide the
ability to decouple the specific sensor from the platform on which it resides and to make
it one of the sensors available on the task force network and accessible to anyone who has
the necessary access to and need for a source of data.  Not only does this enable the
actual range over which a sensor’s data is contributing to be significantly increased but it
also means that participating platforms have access to the ‘best’ sensor available within
the task force thereby increasing the quality of the data available.
It will, however, raise many questions of control and authority.
Once the US network has been extended to link to other US surface platform test bed
facilities and the UK end has a similar extended capability, issues such as force data
fusion across the coalition surface and subsurface platforms can be investigated.  This
opens up the possibility for investigating the factors mentioned earlier in the
organisational and doctrine areas:
• The different operating characteristics of the UK and US navies,
• The different command structures.
• The different interpretation of data into information and understanding
• How to operate Network-Centric Command and Control
A further area for investigation will be extending the experiences gained from the
investigations into the spasmodic type of interaction to see if any of the lessons learned
can be used in setting set up the joining and leaving procedures for a platform and a force
network in terms of what is required and how it is controlled.
And in conjunction with these issues the collaboration is looking at how to evaluate the
effectiveness of such interoperability between combat systems and lay down some initial
guidelines for how this type of coalition network might be operated, what the procedures
are for joining and leaving a network-centric force and how to improve the capabilities of
the platforms involved rather than just  “drowning them in data”.  The results of the
collaboration will help to move systems up through the information domain from the data
level to the situation knowledge level and thereby increase the ability to understand and
assess that situation.
Coalition Data server
As has been pointed out, any task force battle group or coalition force naval operation
requires coordinated communication among diverse platforms and integration of
information assets for success.  Additionally, the requirement is for naval combat systems
of diverse manufacture, providing different views of the battle space with different levels
of confidence and capability, to interact effectively and flexibly as a system of systems
for effective mission accomplishment.
The coalition needs expressed above distils to an initial aim, which is to transfer data
between heterogeneous platforms with the minimum of the human intervention required
for the information exchange.  The proposal is to adopt a flexible architecture to facilitate
current as well as future requirements, and the eXtensible Markup Language (XML)
provides a way that facilitates one machine’s applications to interact with another using a
common human readable data format.  The intention is to build a prototype CDS to
incorporate US and UK coalition applications by building XML parsers and generators
for each application and to use the Servers as the bridge (translator) between coalition
data and application specific data with an interactive Java CDS viewer with read and
write capability.  The basic aim is to show the ability of the CDS to make data available
to a remote platform.
When using XML, it is possible for a system to receive XML-tagged data from another
system, and the other can receive XML-tagged data from the first.  Neither of them needs
to know how the other's system is organized.  If another partner or supplier teams up with
the network, there is no need to write code to exchange data with their system.  They are
simply required to follow the document rules defined in the schema.
One of the early tasks has been to standardize on a schema to define coalition data
content.  An XML schema defines what tags can go in your document, what tags can
contain other tags, the number and sequence of the tags, the attributes the tags can have,
and optionally, the values those attributes can have.  To achieve this, the data
requirements of current US / UK applications have been examined.  The initial sample of
data messages has yielded a schema, which, although not complete, serves the purposes
for exploring the concepts identified above.
Effectiveness of Joint/Coalition Forces
In parallel with the research identified above, a major activity during this work must be
the identification of measures of effectiveness for joint/coalition force activities.  While it
may be possible to exchange information, it is essential that there is some means of
assessing the effectiveness of what is being achieved.  This will need to take into
consideration both the national and joint/coalition requirements and to what level the
coalition platform systems will be integrated into a task force unit.  It will of necessity
not only address the technical issues, but also will have to deal with the command and
doctrinal issues that will arise.
Summary
The adoption of an early integration testing approach in the development of complex
systems has proven to be a success.  In fact, the U. S. Navy has since embarked on the
establishment of a Distributed Engineering Plant (DEP) and a Collaborative Engineering
Environment (CEE) modelled on their Wide Area Integration Facility (WAIF)
experiences. From an architectural perspective, the development issues and the
operational issues are seen to have much in common where test and integration are
concerned. This approach is now being employed at the joint/coalition force level and the
avoidance of operational problems achievable as a result of adopting such an approach is
substantial.
Taken in its broadest view, interoperability is more than just connectivity and
communications.  Its import goes beyond just command and planning activities to
embrace real time sensor data integration among collaborating platforms.  In a real sense
the objective is a virtual combat system that spans platforms.  The drive for interoperable
combat systems is a natural consequence of the increasing emphasis on information
warfare, of the increasing reliance on joint and coalition forces to achieve military
objectives, of the increasing reliance on commercial technologies, and on the decreasing
defense acquisition and research and development budgets.  Needing or desiring
interoperability is not the same as achieving it however.  There remains much to do to
bring about the interoperable combat systems needed for success in the era of network-
centric operations and information warfare.
As we seek to manage an information landscape that is more comprehensive and diverse
each day, it is important to guard against the technological imperative to do things merely
because we can.  Access to all information all of the time is not the optimal design
objective for combat systems.  It is not even desirable.  We must also guard against the
tendency to confuse technology with engineering.  Proper use of technology requires that
we engineer our systems with careful attention to architectural issues.  There remains
plenty of work to do.  A near-term list might include:
The bottom line objective in the search for combat systems that are both operable and
interoperable must never be lost sight of: providing the right amount of the right
information to the right place at the right time in the right format.
The experience so far from the first phase has validated the basic tenet that the problems
under investigation are not simple.  In order for two similar, yet fundamentally dissimilar,
systems to work together a common understanding is required of the terminology and
ways in which tasks are carried out.  The learning curve is steep and progress at times
seems slow, but at least the problems are being identified and resolved before the real
platforms, and the related costs that would incur, are involved.
Identifying the consequences of interfacing systems designed to different architectural
standards
Developing measures of architectural openness
Overcoming obstacles to wide-area distribution of time critical sensor-to-shooter loops
Determining the extent of necessary commonality in deployed information
infrastructure
Understanding and coping with terminological and training barriers to interoperable
coalition force combat systems
Identification of an appropriate Combat System Interface Profile to support
interoperability
Developing criteria for managing the information landscape
